Challenges to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents  by Plomer, Aurora et al.
Cell Stem Cell
CommentaryChallenges to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents
Aurora Plomer,1 Kenneth S. Taymor,2 and Christopher Thomas Scott3,*
1Sheffield Institute of Biotechnological Law and Ethics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 1FL, UK
2Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94704-7230, USA
3Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
*Correspondence: cscott@stanford.edu
DOI 10.1016/j.stem.2007.12.006
The patenting of human embryonic stem (hES) cells has produced one of the most unusual and fraught sit-
uations in the history of science, ethics, and law. This Commentary examines legal and moral challenges to
three foundational patents held by theWisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF). We conclude that, in
the United States, technical challenges may, paradoxically, produce a stronger patent position for WARF. In
the European Union, moral challenges mean confusion for member states. We demonstrate that hES cell
intellectual property will be guided and bound by a welter of moral, technical, and legal inputs, with discrete
national and jurisdictional dimensions.Introduction
In the November 6, 1998 issue of the journal Science, James
Thomson, a professor at the Wisconsin Regional Primate Re-
search Center at the University of Wisconsin, reported he had
developed the first line of human embryonic stem cells. Penned
in the typical understatement of research writing, the abstract
of the research report declares, ‘‘These cell lines should be use-
ful in human developmental biology, drug discovery, and trans-
plantation medicine’’ (Thomson et al., 1998). It is unlikely that
10 years ago Thomson could imagine the torturous road his dis-
coveries would take as they moved from the bench into broader
use.
Just as human embryonic stem (hES) cells ignited a contro-
versy about the use of human embryos for research and medi-
cine, challenges to Thomson’s patents have emerged. Critics
claim the broadness of the patents and the aggressive actions
of the patent holders stifle innovation, particularly in California,
where a multibillion-dollar stem cell initiative has recently begun
to fund embryonic stem cell research (Murray, 2007). In the
United States, opponents have attacked the patents as merely
an extension of prior work, arguing they fail to meet the basic re-
quirement that a patent be novel. Worries in Europe hark back to
1998, when the European Union (EU) adopted the Directive on
Biotechnological Inventions. A clause in the Directive has been
interpreted to preclude patents on inventions that required the
destruction of human embryos. Each challenge is sourced by
a very different locus of concern. The first seeks to invalidate
the patents on technical grounds; the other would deny their
claims on moral grounds. Both strategies have met with initial
success.
This Commentary examines each challenge in turn and arrives
at two conclusions. First, we contend that the US system, which
prevents challenges until after a patent is used and then relies on
the reexamination process, may, paradoxically, enhance and
strengthen Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF)’s
patent position and serve to increase its patent estate. Second,
the European Patent Office (EPO)’s current bar on hES cell pat-
ents illuminates a complex patent protection picture inasmuch
as EU member states retain a degree of autonomy over the
implementation of moral exclusions. A closer look at Europereveals the disjunction between the EPO and certain national
policies. The consequences of the first challenge may mean
further barriers for competitors in jurisdictions in which the US
patents are enforced. The consequences of the second chal-
lenge may be confusion and conflict for EU states.
Challenges in the United States
On the heels of Thomson’s discovery came three foundational
patents, which he assigned to his sponsoring nonprofit organiza-
tion,WARF (Thomson, 1998, 2001, 2006). These patents were is-
sued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
and apply throughout the United States. WARF did not file for
patents in Asia but did file at the EPO and in individual European
nations.
The first WARF patent, issued in December 1998, claims the
general class of primate embryonic stem cells; the March 2001
patent, nearly identical to the first, directs the claims to hES cells;
and the third patent describes proliferating hES cells maintained
without the growth factor LIF, a protein normally expressed in the
developing embryo. The patents are both bold and broad: they
claim a right to all hES cell lines with the described characteris-
tics (the ‘‘composition of matter’’) and to the particular method of
making them (the ‘‘process’’). The composition of matter claim is
the key strength: it trumps the product of any other process
invention that might yield lines of hES cells. The practical conse-
quence is that not only canWARF charge for the lines it owns, but
anywhere the patent is in force it can prohibit anyonewhowishes
tomake, use, or sell hES cell lines by anymethodwithout first ne-
gotiating a fee-based, royalty-bearing license. Two licensing
strategies lie at the heart of the current controversies. Early on,
WARF adopted what some considered an unusually aggressive
and restrictive policy toward educational and scientific institu-
tions, which slowed distribution of cell lines and cast a shadow
over the ability of researchers to advance knowledge. In the
commercial sphere, WARF’s most prominent agreement is
with Geron, which has an exclusive license to develop therapeu-
tic and diagnostic products from hES cell-derived neural,
pancreatic, and cardiac cells. While WARF licensees can re-
search these fields, any commercial potential would be subject
to approval by and payments to Geron.Cell Stem Cell 2, January 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 13
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organization involved in the passage of California’s Proposition
71, and the New York-based Public Patent Foundation voiced
concern about the patents’ broad reach,WARF’s tough licensing
stance, and its public pronouncements that it would extract fees
fromany income the statemight receive fromdiscoveries coming
from its $3 billion California Institute for Regenerative Medicine
(WARF later dropped the CIRM licensing demand). Attorneys
asked the USPTO to revoke the Thomson patents on grounds
that they overreach and that the methods described in their
claims were already published in the public domain (so-called
‘‘prior art’’). Several prominent stem cell researchers have sup-
ported the challenge, asserting that the primary reason that the
prior art wasn’t successfully applied was because researchers
competing with Thomson didn’t have the financial resources to
apply the techniques to a human system (Holden, 2007).
In a preliminary ruling made in March, the USPTO declared all
three patents invalid. It partially agreed with the challenges and
found that the disclosures in Thomson’s claims would be obvi-
ous to a person with ordinary skill in the art using public informa-
tion available at the time of the patent application and that the
claims were anticipated by prior patents. Some contend the
ruling has dealt a severe blow to WARF’s monopoly position,
allowing researchers to more freely pursue hES cell research
(Check, 2007).
Yet three facets of the reexamination cast doubt on the effec-
tiveness of the strategy: (1) WARF can engage in a lengthy
appeals process; (2) during the reexamination and appeals the
patent remains fully in force; and (3) unsuccessful reexaminations
can result in a stronger patent. When viewed in the context of the
activities taken and opportunities lost in the years leading up to
the reexamination, WARF and its licensee, Geron, may have an
ironclad grip on major fields of hES cell development and com-
mercialization, regardless of the reexamination’s outcome.
Challenges to patents are not uncommon and do not always
reflect an inherent weakness in the patent. The US patent system
does not provide the public or outside experts with an opportu-
nity to comment on or challenge a pending patent application. An
invention is evaluated only through published literature disclosed
by the applicant or information uncovered by the examiner. Once
aUSpatent is granted, there are twomethods to attack it. A busi-
ness infringing on the patent, or using the invention without a li-
cense, might ask a court to declare the patent invalid. This strat-
egy has serious drawbacks for the challenger. The challenger
must invest in the use of the patented technology without know-
ing if it will eventually lose and be forced to pay damages and
royalties to the patent holder. Additionally, the costs of the law-
suit can easily reach into the millions of dollars.
An alternative to a lawsuit is to petition the USPTO to reex-
amine the patent. This is far less costly and can be started before
the challenger invests in research that might infringe. But re-
examinations have significant drawbacks. An invalidation law-
suit features serial investigations, expert cross-examinations,
and liberal rules for introducing evidence. And, the decision
makers—judge and/or jury—are independent of the USPTO,
which originally issued the patent. A reexamination, by contrast,
presents a challenger with a limited opportunity to present evi-
dence and no right to ask questions of the patent holder or chal-
lenge its submissions. The USPTO makes the final decision.14 Cell Stem Cell 2, January 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.In general, while biotech patents may be more susceptible to
challenge than patents in other fields, these challenges take
a long time to resolve: the median length of time between
a USPTO challenge and a resolution is 6.5 years (Graham
et al., 2002). Long resolution times can favor the patent holder.
A prominent example is Genentech’s Cabilly II, a sweeping
monoclonal antibody manufacturing patent due to expire in 2016.
A 2005 reexamination resulted in a rejection of the patent’s
claims; Genentech appealed, and in 2007 it was again rejected.
The company can appeal once more, and if it fails again, it can
ask the courts to confirm the patent’s validity. Last year alone
the patent earned Genentech over $100 million, giving the com-
pany incentives to delay a decision through appeals, which could
drag on until well into the next decade (Waltz, 2007).
The Cabilly II case is instructive to evaluating the impact of the
WARF challenge. One might think the uncertainty surrounding
the challenge would promote unlicensed activity or, more dra-
matically, cause some licensees to stop paying royalties. We
believe these scenarios are unlikely and note that they have
not arisen in the context of Cabilly II. Investors are unlikely to
fund companies who rely on unlicensed use of patented tech-
nologies while the outcome of a reexamination is uncertain. If
a competing company successfully developed a new product
utilizing the technology, and the challenge failed, the company
would face an infringement claim and potentially ruinous de-
mand for damages and future royalties. Because the Thomson
patents remain in force during the course of the reexamination,
WARF and Geron can continue to extract fees and royalties
through licenses and sublicenses. If the licensee refuses to
pay and the patent is ultimately found valid, it could lose its
rights to exploit the technology (negating the value of its invest-
ment in the technology) and/or be forced to pay significant dam-
ages. In its responses to the initial USPTO action, WARF has
amended and narrowed existing claims and added three new
claims, distinguishing the differences between the Thomson
method for deriving primate ES cells and the prior art of mouse
ES cell culture methods. In its filing, WARF implied that if any-
thing about the work is obvious it is the work’s breakthrough:
‘‘the level of acclaim in the art for Dr. Thomson’s invention bears
witness to the fact that the isolation of primate/human ES cells
represented true innovation that was not simply a small step in
embryonic stem cell research’’ (Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation, 2007).
Though it is difficult to predict the results of the reexamination,
WARF has reason to express confidence. Most reexaminations
uphold the patent under challenge. Reexaminations initiated by
third parties results in cancellation of the entire patent only
12% of the time; 29% confirm it, and 59% confirm it with modi-
fications to the claims (United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 2007). The high rates of confirmations arise partially be-
cause patent holders themselves initiate 50% of reexaminations
for purposes of buttressing their claims. They do this because
challengers must present more persuasive evidence to a court
to invalidate patents that have survived reexamination. Because
challengers have less opportunity to present evidence and ques-
tion a patent during reexamination, the patent holder can reason-
ably expect that the process is unlikely to uncover all damaging
evidence. The end result is that a reexamination may serve to
strengthen the position of WARF.
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regardless of the reexamination’s outcome, WARF and Geron’s
positions are already cemented in several fields of hES cell
research and development. They have continued to file deriva-
tive and follow-on inventions, which will further establish their
dominance. Even if Thomson’s patents are overturned, the
new inventions may be valid and present barriers to competition.
There are additional reasons to suggest that WARF and Geron
will emerge from the reexamination in a powerful position even if
the original patents are found invalid. Thomson’s patents had the
advantage of being both ‘‘first mover’’ technologies (capturing
market share) and discoveries upstream from derivative inven-
tions (capturing inventiveness). They were issued when the field
was very young and its commercial potential uncertain. Further,
WARF’s early policies limited researchers’ access to lines to pro-
duce inventions that might advance the field. Scientists working
in the nonprofit sector often risk infringement because patent
holders have little incentive to sue them. In the nascent hES
cell field, even researchers willing to risk infringement could
not obtain cell lines from WARF without agreeing to its licensing
terms. Finally, restrictions on the use of federal funds for hES cell
research restricted competition to WARF and Geron. Using their
own lines and funding, their intellectual property estates contin-
ued to grow, protecting them should the Thomson patents be
found invalid.
Challenges in Europe
The European response raises issues of a very different kind
from the preliminary denial of the WARF claims in the US. The
EU Directive on Biotechnological Inventions was adopted in
1998 to harmonize patent laws among member states. It con-
tains Article 5, which prohibits the patenting of the human
body at the various stages of its formation and development,
and Article 6, which prevents patents on inventions that are con-
trary to ‘‘public order’’ or morality. Article 6 also lists inventions
that are not patentable, including cloning humans, processes
for modifying the genetic identity of humans through the germ-
line, and ‘‘uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial
purposes’’(European Parliament Directive, 1998). The list was
supposed to be illustrative of the existing consensus at the
time on the type of inventions that were considered to be morally
unpatentable. However, the fragmentation of national and Euro-
pean courts’ jurisdiction over the Directive’s implementation has
generated considerable legal uncertainty and obscured patent-
ing strategies in the field.
The 1973 European Patent Convention (EPC) treaty governs
patents issued by the EPO. The EPC provides a uniform exami-
nation and granting process, saving inventors time and the costs
of applying at individual national patent offices. However, once
granted by the EPO, a patent is subject to the law of each desig-
nated state. Consequently, the benefits of filing with the EPO are
largely dependent on the degree of certainty of the fate of a
patent under national law, particularly in the volatile field of moral
exclusions. An additional complication is that the EuropeanCourt
of Justicemay not reviewdecisions of the EPO, because the EPO
is not a party to the EU (though it agreed to transpose the Direc-
tive’s moral language into the EPC in 1999). By contrast, the
European Court of Justice has the authority to rule whether
national patent laws conform to the Directive—a power it hasalready exercised in several cases. Therefore, applicants who
file directly with national patent offices can short-circuit the legal
process and secure an early advantage in attaining patent
protection.
Still, considerable doubts and concerns were voiced over the
uncertainty and interpretive difficulty caused by moral exclusion
clauses (see Llewelyn, 1997; Crespi, 2003; Gitter, 2001). It was
feared that the inclusion of specific exempted technologies
would create an inflexible and immutable framework, binding
regulators to moral definitions unreflective of changing societal
views. Legal scholars pointed out that patent examiners, whose
professional expertise is predominantly grounded in scientific
and technical knowledge, would lack the relevant expertise to
evaluate the morality of an invention. Neither was it clear how
the EPC, whichwould likely implement the Directive, would inter-
act with EU law, because the EPC provides a distinct and sepa-
rate legal framework for granting patents through the EPO.
Finally, the task of ascertaining the precise scope of moral
exemptions while preserving the autonomy of member states
in a diverse and pluralistic Europe was a formidable legal and
constitutional challenge. As the turbulent implementation of the
Directive unfolds, the legal complexities have crystallized on
the much-disputed hES cell patents.
Since the Directive’s adoption, the range of possiblemeanings
encompassed by the wording of restrictions on commercial and
industrial uses of human embryos is illustrated by different inter-
pretations adopted by European patent offices and courts
(Plomer, 2006). In a spectrum from the most permissive to the
most restrictive, the UKPatent Office, the Swedish Patent Office,
the European Group on Ethics (EGE), the EPO, and the German
Federal Patent Court have adopted distinct but conflicting inter-
pretations of excluded patents on the basis of Articles 5 and 6.
One notable case centers on the EPO’s revocation of a stem
cell patent issued to the University of Edinburgh. The patent,
naming inventors Austin Smith and Peter Mountford, has several
claims relating to the isolation, selection, and propagation of an-
imal transgenic stem cells. The EPOboard appointed to consider
the case, the Opposition Division (OD), held that the patent con-
travened a rule that had been transposed directly from Article
6(2)(c), namely, the prohibition on ‘‘uses of human embryos for
industrial or commercial purpose.’’ Even in the absence of a uni-
form moral approach to human ES cells in Europe, the OD rea-
soned that the rule ‘‘. has to be interpreted broadly to encom-
pass not only the industrial or commercial use of human embryos
but also the human ES cells retrieved therefrom by destruction of
human embryos’’ (European Patent Office Opposition Division,
2003). Importantly, the OD’s interpretation excludes not only
patents on direct uses of the human embryo but also patents
on all downstream derivatives, including stem cell lines whose
derivation required the destruction of the embryo (Laurie, 2004).
In reaching its opinion, the OD distanced itself from a prior
opinion by the EuropeanGroup on Ethics, which deemed patent-
able any hES cells modified for therapeutic or other uses includ-
ing processes involving human stem cells, irrespective of
source. The OD described the EGE opinion as not only riddled
with ‘‘inconsistencies and logical flaws’’ but also as incompatible
with existing patent law and the Directive and as such recom-
mended that it should be ‘‘disregarded in toto’’ (European Patent
Office Opposition Division, 2003).Cell Stem Cell 2, January 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 15
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odds with a narrow view adopted by the UK’s intellectual prop-
erty office in 2003, which drew a distinction between totipotent
cells—which have the potential to ‘‘develop into an entire human
body’’—and pluripotent cells, which cannot. According to theUK
ruling, totipotent cells are encompassed by Article 5 of the Direc-
tive, which prohibits the patenting of the human body at the var-
ious stages of development. In addition, the UK patent office will
not grant patents on processes to obtain cells from human em-
bryos, which it considers to fall under the exclusion of industrial
or commercial uses of embryos in Article 6. But it reasoned that
pluripotent cells—which do not have the potential to develop into
an entire human body—are not caught by the exclusion, and are
patentable. Thus, the UK’s policy permits patents on laboratory-
derived hES cells and more differentiated kinds of stem cells
(United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, 2003).
In reaching this interpretation, the UK patent office took into
account the fact that, while there had been some opposition to
hES cell research, both the legislative framework and concurring
view fromprofessional, independent, and legislative bodies were
supportive of the research (see Donaldson Committee, 2000;
The Royal Society, 2000; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2001;
House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research,
2002). Implicit in the reasoning is the arguably justified assump-
tion that moral exemptions to patents should not conflict with
a morally permissive regulatory regime on research.
The UK policy produced a permissive environment for hES cell
patents, and like their strategy in the US, WARF and Geron and
other entities have used the national office route to aggressively
file both foundational patents and follow-on inventions, including
claims on differentiated cells made from embryonic lines. Our
search of hES cell patents in the UK reveals a broad range of dis-
coveries, including embryonic cell subtypes, somatic stem cells
(hematopoietic and neural stem cells), progenitor cells (osteo-
blasts), and terminally differentiated types (b islet cells, dopami-
nergic neurons, cardiomyocytes, hepatocytes, and oligodendro-
cytes). Patented methods included cell culture, transduction,
and expansion systems. (A Delphion search for US and UK pat-
ents held by WARF and Geron was performed using classifiers
from European Classification System [ECLA]. The classifiers
included C12N5 [microorganisms, enzymes, or compositions
thereof] together with either /06 [animal cells or tissues] or /08
[human cells or tissues]).
Sweden’s interpretation of a WARF patent application claim-
ing hematopoietic cells derived from hES cells is also seemingly
at odds with the EPO position, and as such may emerge as
another route for national-based hES cell patent strategies. In
2004, the Swedish Patent Office granted the patent on the
grounds that it did not involve repetitive use of human embryos.
WARF’s corresponding application had been refused by the
EPO the previous year despite the fact that the claims did not
pertain to hES cells but to in vitro differentiated cells and their
uses. The EPO’s Examining Division (ED) considered that
.the present claims to fall under the exclusion.since the
methods of the present application as well as the products
derived therefrom cannot be obtained from a source other
than the human embryo. For the purpose of morality as-
sessment it is not sufficient that the objectable method is16 Cell Stem Cell 2, January 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.not claimed per se, as long as it is the only thinkable—and
workable—option of obtaining the claimed subject-matter.
(Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 2004)
This decision is consistent with the ruling in the Edinburgh
case. Yet the EPO’s policy is not altogether clear. The Edinburgh
ruling aside, the EPO has granted at least one patent on embry-
onic stem cell derivatives, specifically a patent on neural precur-
sor cells. TheGermanPatent Office originally issued the patent in
1999 to Oliver Bru¨stle, but the German Federal Patent Court re-
cently annulled the patent in part in December 2006 following
a challenge by Greenpeace. Though Bru¨stle did not disclose
the origin of the embryonic lines and the methods are murine
based, the court ruled that the invention was not patentable on
moral grounds. The litigation and ruling centered on a hypothet-
ical use of his invention. The patent was denied because neural
precursor cells could be made from the destruction of human
embryos (Grund et al., 2007). By contrast, in separate proceed-
ings at the EPO, Bru¨stle was granted a corresponding patent by
the EPO in March 2006. But surprisingly, Geron has emerged as
the challenger. In opposition proceedings to the Bru¨stle patent,
Geron is claiming—inter alia—that the patent contravenes the
morality clause transposed from the Directive.
Proceedings for this challenge have been put on hold pending
the outcome of WARF’s appeal to the Enlarged Board of Appeal
(EBA) at the EPO. WARF is seeking patent protection on primate
(including human) embryonic stem cells and on methods of
maintaining and using them. The questions under appeal arise
from the claims, namely, that it was not possible for the skilled
person to prepare and use human embryonic stem cells without
using and destroying spare preimplantation human embryos.
Specifically, the EPO is considering the following question:
‘‘[Do moral exemptions] forbid the patenting of claims directed
to products (here: human embryonic stem cell cultures) which—
as described in the application—at the filing date could be pre-
pared exclusively by a method which necessarily involved the
destruction of the human embryos from which the said products
are derived, if the said method is not part of the claims’’?
The much-awaited ruling on the WARF patents should at least
settle some of the ongoing questions on the scope of application
of the moral exemption clauses to human embryonic stem cells.
However, we argue it will not resolve the latent tensions regard-
ing the legal coexistence, overlap, and possible conflict between
the multiple jurisdictional frameworks and actors vested with the
power to grant and determine the validity of biotech patents in
Europe. Tensions will unavoidably arise from the fragmentation
over the implementation of the Directive and the diversity of
moral views among European states. National patent offices
are not strictly bound by the EPO’s jurisprudence and may de-
velop national policies onmoral exclusions within the constraints
set by the Directive on Biotechnological Inventions, as member
states are under an obligation to implement the Directive.
Though the EPO administers European patents, in the event of
conflict or doubt over the implementation of the Directive, the
European Court of Justice will be the ultimate arbiter. ECJ
case law indicates that member states are likely to be granted
a wide margin of discretion when interpreting moral exclusions,
in deference to the diversity of moral and legal opinion about
this sensitive and important scientific field.
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Europe’s hES cell patent landscape exists in a fractured and
conflicting legal environment. The EPO’s forthcoming ruling in
the WARF case is unlikely to conclusively settle the emerging
tensions and uncertainty on the scope of moral exclusions on
hES cell patents. Whatever the outcome of the WARF appeal,
in a morally diverse Europe the default strategy for patent appli-
cants is to file at the national level. In fact, some astute applicants
have already leapt ahead of their competitors, bypassing the
EPO to secure patents from strategically chosen national patent
offices. To complete the legal maze, the opinions of the Euro-
pean Group on Ethics, which the Directive empowers to issue
guidance on the ethics of biotechnological inventions at the level
of basic principles, are not legally binding on the ECJ, the EPO,
or the national patent offices.
While the US reexamination proceeds, the Thomson patents
will undergo the more routine challenges of innovation. Promp-
ted by moral worries of using frozen human embryos to derive
new lines, new reports of alternative methods have been put for-
ward. Most recently, a group of articles describe methods of
making embryonic-like lines without embryos or eggs (see Taka-
hashi et al., 2007; Maherali et al., 2007; Egli et al., 2007; De Coppi
et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2007). Further experimentation with these
alternative derivation techniques in human systems, whether
driven by moral concerns or scientific curiosity, is one of the
few areas in the field that may remain outside the scope of the
WARF patents. While these techniques, especially those with
human cells, may create inventions that fall outside Thomson’s
broad claims over the composition of hES cell lines, the reexami-
nation will likely not resolve this question (Taymor et al., 2006).
Moreover, even if Thomson’s patents fall, scientific or commer-
cial exploitation of hES cells will be subject to substantial patent
estates developed by WARF and Geron during the drawn-out
review and appeal process. It is likely that both entities will con-
tinue to file new patents and license existing intellectual prop-
erty, increasing their dominance in the commercialization of
stem cell technologies.
The patenting and commercialization of hES cells have
produced one of the most unusual and fraught situations in the
history of science, ethics, and law. hES cell intellectual property
and its future impact on human health will be guided and bound
by a welter of moral, technical, and legal inputs, with discrete na-
tional and jurisdictional dimensions. The complex and troubled
landscape of embryonic stem cell intellectual property stands
in stark contrast to the flattening world predicted by the global-
ization of other groundbreaking technologies.
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